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Abstract
Cultural selection models aim to explain cultural phenomena as the products of a 
selective process, often characterising institutions, practices, norms or behaviours as 
adaptations. I argue that a lack of attention has been paid to the explanatory power 
of cultural selection frameworks. Arguments for cultural selection frequently depend 
on demonstrating only that selection models can in principle be applied to culture, 
rather than explicitly demonstrating the explanatory payoffs that could arise from 
their application. Understanding when and how cultural selection generates powerful 
explanations is crucial to evaluating cultural selection, as well as realising its prom-
ised epistemic and practical benefits. I argue that the ability for cultural selection to 
explain ‘design without a designer’ is crucial to successful and powerful cultural 
selection explanations. I introduce the strategy of comparing cultural selection to 
goal-directed agent accounts in order to evaluate when cultural selection can provide 
distinctive explanatory payoffs, drawing on two case studies to illustrate the ben-
efits of this strategy. I argue that a focus on phenomena which cannot be explained 
through intention or agency-based explanations in particular could provide a fruitful 
avenue to identifying the cases where cultural selection can be insightfully applied.
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Introduction
Evolution by natural selection has transformed our understanding of the biologi-
cal world, providing a powerful explanation for the range of adaptations we see in 
biological organisms. Many aspects of culture seem similarly adaptive, in that they 
benefit individuals or groups, and allow us to thrive in a range of environments. 
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Joseph Henrich (2015) gives the example of the Pama-Nyungan peoples in Aus-
tralia: various aspects of their culture, including their ritual and foraging practices, 
were adaptive in the sense that they enabled the maintenance of large communities. 
In large-scale industrial societies, we could view a range of institutions as having 
adaptive value: for example, the cultural norms of firms may contribute to their suc-
cess on the marketplace, conservation laws may be adaptive in that they ensure the 
long-term sustainability of a particular resource, and adherence to social norms such 
as driving on the same side of the road allow large communities to coordinate their 
actions. Given this range of apparently adaptive behaviour, the application of selec-
tion to culture appears promising.
Cultural selection is a thriving area of research that often aims to characterize 
cultural phenomena, including institutions, practices, norms and behaviours, as 
adaptations arising from a selective process. Broadly, we can understand cultural 
selection as referring to “selection on differences between individuals with respect 
to their cultural variants” (Birch 2017, p. 196).1Cultural selection has been invoked 
as an explanation for a diverse range of phenomena, including the evolution of eth-
nic markers (McElreath et al. 2003), the development of prosocial religion (Noren-
zayan et  al. 2016), adaptive food taboos (Henrich and Henrich 2010), large-scale 
human warfare (Zefferman and Mathew 2015), and the broad cooperative norms and 
institutions that characterise human societies (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Authors 
such as Henrich (2015) make the case that the success of the human species in thriv-
ing in a vast range of environments is due to our unique capacity for cumulative 
cultural evolution. He draws upon examples of failed European colonial expeditions, 
such as that of the explorers Burke and Wills, to show how important the cumulative 
cultural adaptations built up by indigenous people were to their survival. The fact 
that Europeans struggled to survive in those same environments, despite having the 
same innate cognitive capacities, is taken as an indication that it is the lack of cumu-
lative cultural adaptations that determined their failure, rather than, for example, the 
kinds of mental modules posited by evolutionary psychologists. Richerson and Boyd 
(2005) similarly stress the power of cultural selection to build cultural adaptations. 
Their work has included the development of formal models to show that, given cer-
tain assumptions regarding cultural transmission and inheritance, beneficial norms 
could spread through populations through selection (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 2002, 
2009; Boyd et al. 2011).
Cultural selection research has often centered around the capacity for cultural 
selection to operate in principle, relying on drawing analogies between cultural and 
biological systems (e.g., Mesoudi et al. 2004; Richerson et al. 2016), or developing 
formal models that demonstrate that cultural selection mechanisms could in princi-
ple drive the spread of adaptive variants (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 2009). Cultural 
1 Birch (2017, p. 197–202) goes on to distinguish between two types of cultural selection: one where 
differences in cultural variants result in differences in biological fitness (which can also occur in non-
human species) and one where differences in cultural variants result in differences in cultural fitness. A 
significant proportion of work in the field concerns the second type (particularly studies exploring recent 
or current cultural selection), and this is what I primarily focus on here.
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selection can be understood as an analogue of natural selection, where cumula-
tive selection could lead to complex cultural adaptations. Cultural selection can be 
couched in terms of the Lewontin conditions: there is variation in cultural traits, 
these traits differ in their fitness, and there is a mechanism of inheritance (Lewontin 
1970).2 If these conditions are fulfilled, we would expect fitter traits to spread 
throughout the population. When this process is cumulative, we could see the gen-
eration of complex adaptations resulting from successive rounds of selection.
If the claims of cultural selection proponents were true, then cultural selection 
could be a powerful force in understanding many aspects of cultural phenomena: 
both the origin of universal tendencies that have shaped human societies over mil-
lennia, as well as the development of key social institutions that structure human 
interaction, and ongoing changes in current norms and practices.
However, the explanatory value of cultural selection has been under-attended 
to. The capacity for cultural selection to act in principle does not mean it is mean-
ingfully explanatory in practice. In assessing the merits of using cultural selection 
frameworks or models, it is important not just to show that cultural systems possess 
features necessary to undergo adaptive evolution, but also to identify the explanatory 
payoffs that cultural selection can give us, over and above alternative frameworks. 
Despite claims that progress in the social sciences has been painfully slow (Mesoudi 
et al. 2006), it is undeniable that there already exists a very substantial body of work 
in disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, and history, that study cultural phe-
nomena and cultural change, using their own frameworks and methodologies, and 
with their own explanatory goals. To some extent, given the range of work already 
in existence, the challenge for advocates of cultural selection is to show that there 
are significant aspects of culture still lacking explanation, that these lack explanation 
due to the shortcomings of other frameworks, and that an evolutionary approach can 
make meaningful contributions to our understanding of these phenomena.
Furthermore, this question becomes particularly important when considering the 
practical benefits that cultural selection frameworks have been touted to bring. It has 
been suggested that applying cultural selection models could be impactful in fields 
such as sustainability science and innovation. In fact, some authors have asserted 
that evolutionary principles should be at the centre of redesigning worldviews, 
institutions, and technologies (Beddoe et  al. 2009). If cultural selection is going 
to be able to bring these meaningful benefits in terms of addressing urgent global 
challenges, it must be clear both whether and to what extent cultural selection can 
explain the relevant phenomena.
I focus on one epistemic good that cultural selection can bring: the ability to 
explain ‘design without a designer’. I argue that this a key component of successful 
and powerful cultural selection explanations. One way to determine when cultural 
selection explanations are likely to be either plausible or powerful is to compare cul-
tural selection with a goal-directed agent account: if a goal-directed agent account 
2 Cutural selection has also been couched in terms of the Price equation (e.g., El Mouden et al. 2014), 
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can explain everything that a cultural selection account can, this indicates that cul-
tural selection is not a useful tool in this case.
In section  ‘Explaining ‘Design without a Designer’’ I argue for the claim that 
the explanation of ‘design without a designer’ is a central feature of cultural selec-
tion. Although there are other epistemic goods that arise from cultural selection, I 
contend that explaining phenomena that a goal-directed agent account struggles to 
explain is central to the explanatory power of cultural selection. In section  ‘Con-
trasting cultural selection and goal-directed agent explanations’ I introduce and 
defend the strategy of comparing a goal-directed agent explanation with a cultural 
selection explanation. In section ‘Case studies’ I consider two case studies that illus-
trate the benefits of this comparative strategy: the application of cultural selection 
in the context of sustainability science, and the characterisation of cultural adap-
tations in small-scale societies. I then consider two objections to this strategy in 
section ‘Objections’.
Explaining ‘Design without a Designer’
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection has been phenomenally success-
ful in providing a unifying framework, bringing together insights from a wide range 
of disciplines (physiology, development, and taxonomy, amongst others), and trans-
forming our understanding of the biological world. Given this success, it is therefore 
tempting to attempt to expand the application of Darwin’s theory to domains outside 
of biology. In fact, this is the explicit motivation given by some cultural evolution 
theorists for the cultural evolution project as a whole. For example, Mesoudi and 
colleagues in a 2006 paper articulate the promise of the application of Darwinian 
theory to culture as the creation of a ‘cultural synthesis’ that mirrors what has been 
achieved in biology, with what they see as disparate and poorly understood cul-
tural phenomena becoming unified under a broad evolutionary approach. Similarly, 
Muthukrishna and Henrich (2019, p. 223) suggest that dual inheritance theory could 
function as “a theory of human behaviour to unify the psychological and behav-
ioural sciences”.
One way in which the debates over cultural selection have unfolded is in terms 
of the resemblance between cultural and natural selection. There are debates over 
whether cultural selection should be considered Darwinian or Lamarckian, due to 
phenomena such as guided variation (Kronfeldner 2007).3 Additionally, as has been 
3 There are ongoing debates regarding the extent to which cultural selection requires blind variation, 
often in the context of divisions between cultural evolution researchers who emphasise either the role 
of cultural selection or the role of transformation and attraction in patterns of cultural change or stasis 
(Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015). Some argue that the importance of cultural selection depends on the extent 
to which variation is ‘blind’, rather than ‘guided’ (e.g., Claidière et al, 2018), and argue that, since cul-
tural variation is often guided to a large degree, selection is rarely an important force. ‘Guided’ varia-
tion could occur through cognition, or through the environment: this refers to a range of processes that 
systematically bias the variation that arises in a population. However, others argue that this distinction 
is less crucial: for example, Henrich et al. (2008, p. 129) argue that “there is no doubt that, as people 
acquire and modify beliefs, ideas, and values, the variation that is generated can be highly non-random, 
and these nonselective processes shape cultural variation. But so what? Selection occurs anytime there 
is heritable variation that affects survival or reproduction (transmission). It does not matter whether the 
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noted by many authors, key concepts in cultural selection do not have systematic 
definitions or solid theoretical grounding, such as cultural fitness, or the units of 
cultural selection (Wimsatt 1999; Crozier 2008). It is certainly the case that cul-
tural systems bear many disanalogies with biological systems. However, I contend 
that focusing on the explanatory aptness or power of cultural selection provides a 
more fruitful avenue in assessing cultural selection frameworks compared to these 
debates about the strength of the analogy between culture and biology (although 
these debates have illuminated many important points of consideration).
Confusion or vagueness around core concepts in selection is not unique to cul-
ture: we see similar debates in the context of evolutionary biology over the appropri-
ate fitness concept, or population concept, for example (Ariew and Ernst 2009; Ste-
genga 2014), or rethinking the necessity of reproduction, taken to be a core feature 
of populations that can undergo selection, as in Papale (2020). The lack of a single 
fitness or population concept has not hampered the capacity for natural selection 
to be a powerful explanation for organismal adaptation, amongst other phenomena, 
suggesting that this should not be a barrier for the application of cultural selection. 
For example, Ramsey and De Block (2017) note that cultural fitness concepts have 
real and substantial differences from biological fitness concepts. Nevertheless, they 
argue that we can build a concept of cultural fitness that can do the necessary work 
in feeding into cultural selection explanations.
I therefore focus on the explanatory payoffs of cultural selection: why are we 
applying it? What can we explain that we could not previously? For biological 
organisms, there are clear reasons to invoke natural selection. Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection provided a naturalistic explanation for the phenome-
non of organisms appearing adapted to their environment, with a range of ingenious 
solutions to problems of survival (i.e., the appearance of design without the exist-
ence of a designer). One key aspect of the explanatory power of natural selection 
lies in its capacity to explain how features of organisms that appear designed to deal 
with specific challenges posed by their environment came about, without invoking 
intelligence or purpose within that explanation. As Nettle (2020, p. 2) notes, “the 
key insight of Darwinian genetic evolutionary theory was that design-like properties 
could be produced, over time, by selection processes. Thus, it is quite natural, seeing 
variation is random”. Similarly, Mesoudi et al. (2004, p. 4) suggest that “although this variation may not 
be entirely random with respect to selection, ultimately it matters less to the Darwinian process how vari-
ation arises, than that variation exists and is exposed to selection”. My argument here is not directly con-
nected to these debates, in that I am not aiming to give a general account of the conditions under which 
cultural selection occurs. If one believes that cultural selection is rarely important, on the basis of the 
prevalence of guided variation, then one will already be convinced that cultural selection explanations 
are often inappropriate or do not provide epistemic benefits. However, if one takes the position of Hen-
rich or Mesoudi, then there will be many cases in which the conditions for cultural selection to operate 
will obtain. In this case, we can still ask the question of whether there are explanatory benefits to apply-
ing cultural selection. Additionally, there may be cases where variation is blind (and so both sides of this 
debate would agree that cultural selection could, in principle, be at play), and yet, cultural selection does 
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design-like properties in culture, to assume they must be produced by selection pro-
cesses too”.
I argue that we should expect cultural selection frameworks to be able to do the 
same, explaining adaptive fit between cultural variants and environment without 
invoking intention or agency. Although selection plays other explanatory roles in 
biological systems, one distinctive role is that which it plays in explaining adapta-
tion, or design. I use ‘adaptation’ as synonymous with ‘design’ here, adopting the 
definition given by Wertz and Moya (2019), in a paper which highlights the role that 
‘design’ plays in cultural evolutionary theories, as a “structure that is well-suited 
to solve a problem”. As previously noted, we see ‘adaptive’ cultural traits, or those 
with the appearance of ‘design’, everywhere around us, if we construe ‘adaptive’ or 
‘designed’ in this broad sense. This is the role that has been highlighted by several 
key figures in the cultural selection literature: cultural selection proponents often 
point to the capacity for cultural selection to explain ‘cultural adaptations’ (Rich-
erson and Boyd 2005; Henrich and Henrich 2010; Boyd et  al. 2011; Norenzayan 
et  al. 2016; Kline et  al. 2018). These adaptations, construed broadly as structures 
well-suited to solving a problem, could be at either the individual or the group level. 
Additionally, I use this broad definition to avoid assuming the truth of any particular 
account (cultural selection or intentional design) from the outset.4
I will first clarify what is meant here by ‘explanation’ and ‘explanatory power’. 
I will then suggest that, while cultural selection accounts often are able to provide 
explanations of cultural phenomena, they sometimes lack explanatory power in 
comparison to other approaches. I defend this claim against two possible responses: 
that cultural selection can be explanatorily powerful even when it does not explain 
‘design without a designer’ and that cultural selection can still be a useful frame-
work even if it is not explanatorily powerful. I will elaborate on the strategy of com-
paring cultural selection to a goal-directed agent account in section ‘Contrasting cul-
tural selection and goal-directed agent explanations’.
Explanation and explanatory power
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail and defend a par-
ticular philosophical account of explanation, it is worth clarifying what it might 
mean for a cultural selection explanation to truly explain, or to be explanatorily 
powerful. There are two related considerations: firstly, whether a particular account 
constitutes a successful or adequate explanation, and secondly, the degree to which 
an explanation has explanatory power.
There are many accounts of scientific explanation; I will discuss briefly two of the 
most prominent. Under a causal account (such as Woodward 2005, 2010), broadly, 
an explanation involves making a counterfactual claim about the relationship 
4 A narrower definition, such as one that defines an adaptive trait in terms of the extent to which it 
allows an individual or group to survive (and perhaps reproduce), or one that defines an adaptive trait in 
terms of the fulfilment of a goal or intention, would be problematic insofar as it assumes the truth or util-
ity of either cultural selection or a goal-directed agent account from the outset.
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between cause and effect: changing the cause would bring about a change in 
effect.5Giving a causal explanation for a phenomenon is to specify the causal struc-
ture that is responsible for the production of the outcome. Therefore, to character-
ise an adaptive trait as the result of cultural selection would be to identify a selec-
tive process as the cause that is in some way responsible for the adaptive trait. This 
could be the distribution of the trait in the population (why the trait is widespread, 
or why some groups have this trait and not others), or the origin of the trait itself 
(understood in the sense outlined in Godfrey-Smith 2009, where successive rounds 
of selection can explain why a trait exists in its current form at all). In many of the 
cases that are characterised as instances of cultural selection, the intervention that 
would change the cause and search for a change in effect will have to be hypotheti-
cal, as, for example, in cultural group selection interpretations of the development 
of prosocial tendencies in early human societies. The construction of mathematical 
models provides one way in which these hypothetical interventions can be explored. 
However, there is a significant strand of experimental work which implements real-
life interventions to study the relative impacts of selection and other features of cul-
tural transmission (e.g., Acerbi and Tehrani 2018).
Under a unificationist account (such as Kitcher 1981), explanation means unify-
ing a range of different phenomena. This is something that has clear relevance to 
cultural selection: authors have explicitly advocated for the ability for evolutionary 
approaches to culture to unify disparate cultural phenomena (Mesoudi et al. 2006). 
It certainly seems to be the case that cultural selection has more potential to unify 
phenomena than (for example) historical explanations, which may be highly local 
and contextual. If a range of apparently disconnected and very different cultural 
traits, such as food taboos in Fiji, incest avoidance practices, conservation laws, and 
the appeal of Kim Kardashian, could be explained through reference to the same 
process (selection), then under a unificationist account cultural selection seems 
like a successful explanation. However, it is important to be careful here: Kitcher’s 
account requires not only range (that the theory pertains to explananda across many 
domains) but also stringency. The stringency criterion means that explanations must 
also be restricted, and therefore be able to rule out explananda. This is to prevent 
explanations being vacuous. I suggest this is a tendency we see in the literature 
(made clearer by the case studies in section  ‘Objections’): cultural selection has 
been applied in a multitude of contexts, but often at the expense of stringency.
The debates over the similarities or differences between cultural and biological 
systems have an important bearing on whether cultural selection can be considered 
an explanation at all. If it were the case that cultural selection cannot even get off 
the ground, i.e., that cultural systems are too dissimilar to biological systems in key 
respects, then clearly we can rule them out as explanations from the start. This kind 
of move has been made in the debate over memetics: critics have challenged the 
5 There are many dimensions to causal-interventionist accounts that provide criteria under which such 
an explanation is successful, including proportionality, specificity and stability. It could be a fruitful ave-
nue for further research to consider how cultural selection explanations generally score on these criteria, 
although this is outside the scope of this paper.
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conceptual underpinnings of the research programme, such that we have prima facie 
reasons to dismiss memetic explanations out of hand, without consideration of par-
ticular cases or applications (an overview of these critiques can be found in Lewens 
2018).
Regardless, I contend that the more common situation is one in which cultural 
selection can function as an explanation. In some cases, although cultural selection 
can explain, it can do so only weakly. This may be the more epistemically danger-
ous place to be: it is not that a cultural selection account leaps out as clearly unable 
to furnish explanation, but rather, that it appears to provide an explanation, without 
offering much in the way of explanatory power.
I draw on Schupbach and Sprenger’s (2011) account of explanatory power to 
flesh this out. The core of their account of explanatory power lies in the ability for 
a hypothesis to decrease the degree to which we find the explanandum surprising, 
or to increase the degree to which the explanandum is expected. They provide a 
“probabilistic logic of explanation that tells us the explanatory power of a theory 
(explanans) relative to some proposition (explanandum), given that that theory con-
stitutes an explanation of that proposition” (p. 4). In the case of cultural selection, 
we can assume that the theory constitutes an explanation of a given phenomenon 
(in a causal, unificationist, or other sense), which we may often have reason to do. 
Nevertheless, we can assess its explanatory power, and compare this to competing 
alternatives.
When we consider explanations for ‘design without a designer’, we are assum-
ing a highly ‘surprising’ explanandum. If cultural selection can decrease the extent 
to which ‘design without a designer’ is surprising, then this means this explanation 
has a lot of explanatory power. It certainly seems that cultural selection is capable 
of this: natural selection accomplishes this well, and cultural selection appears to be 
the right kind of mechanism that could generate this.
However, the question becomes whether the phenomenon in question is really 
‘design without a designer’ or just ‘design’ (adaptive traits that could have been the 
product of intentional action). This is where the comparison with a goal-directed 
agent account comes in: if a goal-directed agent account can explain the adaptive 
trait, we can no longer characterise it as ‘design without a designer’. If that is the 
case, we are analysing the explanatory power of cultural selection in relation to 
‘design’. In these cases cultural selection will have equal explanatory power, and 
perhaps less explanatory power, than goal-directed agent accounts. I suggest that if 
the goal-directed agent account and the cultural selection account have equal explan-
atory power, we should prefer the goal-directed agent account on the basis of plausi-
bility (as elaborated on in the following section).
Other roles for cultural selection
One possible response would be to highlight the other roles that selection can play, 
other than explaining adaptation. For example, cultural selection could play a role 
in ‘distribution explanations’ (Neander 1995; Godfrey-Smith 2009). Perhaps this is 
not incompatible with an intentional, goal-directed agent account (this issue will be 
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confronted in section  ‘Defending the comparative strategy’). Particularly in cases 
where we have scant data, such as when reconstructing cultural trajectories in our 
evolutionary past, deploying cultural selection models could usefully illuminate fea-
tures of cultural change. Cultural selection models could allow us to analyse patterns 
in the archaeological record and differentiate them from other processes, such as 
drift, thus providing an explanation for the spread of (for example) a particular kind 
of pottery throughout a population. This applies in particular to work within evolu-
tionary archaeology (Lipo and Madsen 2001; Shennan 2020).
Whilst this response is persuasive, my argument would still mean a restriction 
in explanatory scope for cultural selection.6I do not wish to deny the usefulness of 
these approaches. However, as previously highlighted, a key concern of the cultural 
selection literature are cultural adaptations. I take the analogy with biological selec-
tion to be useful here: if natural selection were unable to explain the complex and 
exquisite adaptations we see in the natural world (or were able to do so with no more 
explanatory power than a naïve goal-directed agent account, or another account we 
use intuitively and successfully every day), its explanatory scope would be clearly 
restricted. Claims regarding, for example, selection without reproduction, have 
often involved the question of whether selection in particular contexts is marginal, 
weak, or uninteresting, which is taken to mean the incapacity to act cumulatively 
to produce adaptation (Dawkins 1982; Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2012; Okasha 2006). 
Whilst cultural selection could play valuable roles in a variety of contexts other than 
explaining adaptation, nevertheless, adaptation is a central explanandum. Therefore, 
a strategy that helps to determine the contexts in which cultural selection can explain 
adaptation will have utility and will impact any general claims about the explanatory 
scope of cultural selection.
Alternatively, one could argue that cultural selection frameworks can still have 
value even if they do not provide increased explanatory power. We can see debates 
over a somewhat parallel claim in debates regarding niche construction. Some 
authors have argued for the value of niche construction as a framework for under-
standing biological phenomena. This is not because it is impossible to explain par-
ticular biological phenomena without invoking niche construction as a separate evo-
lutionary process: indeed, opponents point out the capacity for standard approaches 
to explain the targets of niche construction (Scott-Phillips et  al. 2014). However, 
its proponents maintain that recognition of niche construction as a distinct process 
could lead to attending to phenomena that were not attended to previously, and the 
development of explanations for these. Additionally, this approach could generate 
further insights into phenomena that are not captured well by a standard approach 
(Laland and Sterelny 2006; Uller and Helanterä 2017).
This response can be decomposed into two claims about the value of the niche 
construction framework. Firstly, niche construction can be said to have distinct 
6 Here, I take ’explanatory scope’ to be the range of domains to which cultural selection can apply. 
Given my argument, cultural selection would not apply to those cases where the explanandum is an 
adaptation, and where cultural selection has equal or lesser explanatory power than a goal-directed agent 
explanation, thereby reducing its range of domain and therefore its explanatory scope.
 A. Chellappoo 
1 3
   2  Page 10 of 23
heuristic value: it sets an agenda for research, directing researchers’ attention 
towards particular phenomena that were previously neglected. Secondly, think-
ing about certain phenomena in terms of niche construction may add new dimen-
sions to our understanding, even if explanations can be formulated in terms of the 
standard approach. Similarly, in the case of cultural selection, one could argue that 
it has heuristic value. In section  ‘Objections’ I will directly address this claim. I 
suggest that this is possible and would provide justification for adopting a cultural 
selection approach, although there are reasons to be skeptical about its heuris-
tic value. Additionally, one could argue that cultural selection works at a different 
level of explanation. The objection of different levels of explanation is discussed in 
section ‘Objections’.
Although we would expect cultural selection to often constitute an explanation of 
a given cultural phenomenon, there are cases where cultural selection explanations 
will be weak and will not present increased explanatory power compared to alterna-
tive accounts.
Contrasting cultural selection and goal‑directed agent explanations
In the previous sections I have argued that cultural selection should explain the 
existence of ‘design without a designer’ in order to be explanatorily powerful. Here 
I elaborate on the strategy of comparing cultural selection and goal-directed expla-
nations: I argue that when goal-directed explanations and cultural selection expla-
nations can both explain phenomena, and with equal explanatory power, then we 
should prefer the goal-directed agent explanation.
Why should this be the case? Goal-directed agent explanations are widespread 
in cultural systems; unlike in the biological case, we see many ‘designers’. Humans 
are intelligent, goal-directed agents who are able to design or modify tools, arte-
facts, and behaviours to suit their particular purposes. Furthermore, we are often 
able to successfully explain aspects of our human social world in terms of this goal-
directedness. We can often predict and understand the behaviour of others around 
us from what we know about their access to information, capacities and goals.7 I 
suggest that this gives us a reason to prefer the goal-directed agent account over 
the cultural selection account when both have equal explanatory power. Schupbach 
and Sprenger’s conception of explanatory power does not depend on the plausibil-
ity of an explanation: explanations can be powerful but not plausible. They provide 
the example of dehydration versus cyanide poisoning in explaining an individual’s 
set of symptoms: both explanations might be equally powerful in that they equally 
reduce the surprisingness of the explanandum, although one might be more plausi-
ble than the other given the circumstances. Given that we use goal-directed agent 
7 This is related to the concept of ‘folk psychology’, which pertains to the cognitive capacities to explain 
and predict the behaviour of others. However, a goal-directed agent account does not depend on the ver-
dicts of any debates within the folk psychology literature in philosophy of mind, including the way it is 
represented in the brain and the structure of folk psychology as a theory.
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explanations all the time, with a long track record of success, we should take them to 
be more plausible. This difference in plausibility can ‘break the tie’ when comparing 
cultural selection and goal-directed agent accounts.
What does a goal-directed agent account entail? It is important to clarify that 
this conception does not require that an individual behaves as a perfectly rational 
agent, maximising their expected utility. The key to a goal-directed agent account 
is intention: a goal-directed agent acts with intention towards a particular goal, and 
their action is explicable in terms of their intentions. To reiterate the point made 
in the previous section: if a goal-directed agent account succeeds in explaining a 
given phenomena and does so ‘powerfully’ (it decreases the surprisingness of the 
explanandum), then we have a ‘designer’. It is the agent’s intentions that furnish an 
explanation.
This should not be construed as making the case for goal-directed agent explana-
tions as the be all and end all for understanding culture. Additionally, a goal-directed 
account as I outline it here is a somewhat naive account of human behaviour, which 
is broadly defined and does not offer a full account of why an agent might have those 
particular goals, capacities, or dispositions that she does. This is purposeful. This is 
intended to be the first hurdle when considering and comparing cultural selection 
accounts. This is to say that if we compare the two, and find the goal-directed agent 
explanation cannot explain, or can explain only weakly, a given phenomenon, we 
should not take that as evidence that the cultural selection account is necessarily the 
correct, or most powerful, explanation. Perhaps an anthropological, sociological, or 
historical account which provides explanation not only in terms of individual agent’s 
goals, but also institutional structures and power dynamics, will improve upon a cul-
tural selection account. However, if a cultural selection account falls at this initial 
hurdle (if it cannot explain more, or more powerfully, than a goal-directed agent 
account), then we should doubt its usefulness.
This idea is echoed in debates over ‘functional’ or ‘social selection’ explanations 
in the social sciences. Cultural selection can be understood as one kind of functional 
explanation. Critics of functional explanations in the social sciences, such as Jon 
Elster and Daniel Little, argue that human behaviour is typically best explained 
intentionally, and that adequate functional explanations in fact draw their explana-
tory power from identifying the intentions that sustain a given practice or institution. 
Elster (1984) specifically argues that, in order for an adequate functional explanation 
to be constructed in the social sciences, the function of an institution or behaviour 
must be unintended by the actors producing it, and the causal relationship between 
the behaviour and its function must be unrecognised by these actors. If these condi-
tions are not met (in addition to others) then, according to Elster, a functional expla-
nation will fail, and an explanation in terms of intentionality will be preferable.
Although for Elster, these conditions will be rarely met, cultural selection advo-
cates may argue that there are at least some interesting examples (such as the case of 
cassava processing discussed in the following section) that do fulfil these stringent 
conditions. Wray (2002) argues that functional explanations in the social sciences 
are concerned with explaining the consequences of intentional behaviour that cannot 
be explained through the intentions of agents, and this is where they have explana-
tory value. Functional explanations will be particularly good at explaining ‘latent 
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functions’, i.e., a function that a behaviour has that is unrecognised by the individu-
als themselves. When motives and functions diverge an explanation solely in terms 
of motives or intentions will be insufficient to explain the persistence of particular 
practices or behaviours. Although he does not draw the connection to cultural selec-
tion or cultural group selection work, this corresponds to the kinds of cases that cul-
tural selection advocates such as Henrich identify as particularly amenable to such 
an analysis.
Additionally, Wray emphasises the importance of not only offering evidence in 
support of a functional explanation, but also demonstrating deficiencies with alterna-
tive explanations of the same phenomena. This means drawing explicit comparisons 
with alternative explanations, and asking what is explained by a given functional 
explanation that is unexplained by, for example, rational choice theory. Showing that 
these competing individualist explanations give rise to unexplained anomalies is key 
to developing a compelling functional explanation.
Defending the comparative strategy
One way to challenge this comparative strategy would be on the basis that cul-
tural selection and goal-directed agent explanations can be compatible and should 
not be considered distinct strategies that can be weighed against each other. This 
is related to the question of other roles that cultural selection can play outlined in 
section  ‘Other roles for cultural selection’. For example, in the cultural selection 
approaches proposed by Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, social learning biases can 
structure cultural transmission so that adaptive cultural variants spread throughout 
a population. Here, individuals copy other individuals due to factors such as the 
prevalence of a variant within the population (conformist bias) or features of the 
individual who others seek to copy (model biases). This could be seen as intentional 
in the sense that individuals are choosing to copy a particular behaviour or model.
Here, I draw on Chellappoo (2021), where I critique prestige bias (one such social 
learning bias) as an explanation, contrasting it with an intentional goal-directed 
approach. I argue  that although prestige bias could be understood as describing a 
population-level pattern of cultural transmission, if we do not commit to under-
standing prestige bias as an automatic, implicit cognitive process rather than an 
intentional, conscious process, we lose what is distinctive about prestige bias as an 
explanation for behaviour. The predictions of the prestige bias account construed 
broadly will not differ from the predictions of a goal-directed agent account. Within 
the framing of my argument here, we can understand a prestige bias account con-
strued only in a population-level sense as having equal (or perhaps lesser) explana-
tory power when compared to a goal-directed agent account.8
If this critique generalises to other social learning biases, then we could question 
the characterisation of the social learning biases that undergird cultural selection as 
8 Additionally, she compares Henrich and Henrich’s (2010) prestige bias explanation of the spread of 
food taboos in Fiji to a structurally similar case in Cambridge to illustrate how in certain framings the 
goal-directed agent account will leap out as the most plausible and at least as explanatorily powerful.
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intentional in the relevant sense. Additionally, we can see a parallel between the two 
senses of prestige bias (as a population-level pattern and as one that is grounded 
in automatic and implicit cognition) and different senses of cultural selection (as 
merely a population-level pattern and as one that aims to explain ‘design without 
a designer’). I have argued in section  ‘Other roles for cultural selection’. For the 
importance of assessing cultural selection in the second sense. The comparative 
strategy has value in this second sense. In the following section I make use of case 
studies to make the value of this strategy more concrete.
Case studies
I outline two cases where the strategy of comparing cultural selection and goal-
directed agent explanations can be illuminating. The first, that of cultural selec-
tion models applied to sustainability science, illustrates the dangers of neglecting 
the question of the explanatory payoff of cultural selection. The second, that of the 
cassava processing case, shows how the comparison between cultural selection and 
a goal-directed agent account can provide a reason to pursue a cultural selection 
account.
Cultural selection in sustainability science
We see precisely how selection-based explanations can fail when focusing in on a 
specific domain: the application of cultural selection frameworks to sustainability 
science. Cultural selection could in principle help us to understand and explain the 
aspects of institutions that contribute or work against sustainability, and to target 
interventions more effectively, as outlined in several papers in the 2018 special issue 
of the journal Sustainability Science, titled “Applying Cultural Evolution to Sustain-
ability Challenges”. I will draw on one particular example, the application of cul-
tural selection to the historical changes in institutions and behaviour surrounding 
lobstering in Maine. Waring and Acheson (2018) argue that cultural group selection 
has shaped the institutions and behaviours surrounding this industry and its regula-
tors. Their aim is to explain ‘institutional fit’: the adaptive fit between the institu-
tions associated with the lobstering industry and the environment. So far, this seems 
congruent with the targets of cultural selection; the question is whether we have 
‘design without a designer’, or simply ‘design’.9
9 There is a significant literature around cultural group selection in particular, often set apart from cul-
tural selection more generally (Smith 2020 provides a review). Cultural group selection certainly poses 
unique challenges that cultural selection on the individual level does not, including whether cultural 
groups are the right kind of entity to undergo selection (Palmer et al. 1997, Morin 2018), or if cultural 
groups exhibit features taken to be necessary for selection, such as reproduction (Pinker 2012). However, 
at least some scholars understand cultural group selection as a kind of cultural selection where groups 
are the units under selection, as biological group selection is often understood (Clarke and Heyes 2017). 
The challenges to cultural group selection made by authors such as Olivier Morin and Stephen Pinker 
may well be persuasive; it is outside the scope of this paper to take a stance on this. However, this can 
be set aside for my purposes here. As set out in section ‘Explaining ‘Design without a Designer’’, I wish 
to sidestep the debates over the necessary conditions for cultural selection to take place and the kinds 
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Here, I consider one of their examples in some detail: the double gauge law. This 
is a law that set a maximum and minimum size for saleable lobsters, thereby pro-
tecting juveniles and large reproductive-size lobsters from being caught. According 
to Waring and Acheson, this is an example of a ‘social dilemma’. Individuals (and 
harbour gangs) who take all sizes of lobsters will benefit through increased catches 
and therefore increased individual profits. However, restrictions on maximum and 
minimum size benefit the group as a whole (the population of lobsterers in Maine), 
as they protect the reproduction of the lobster population, and therefore prevent a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ from taking place.
Waring and Acheson describe the passage of double gauge laws as follows: a law 
of this kind was initially proposed in 1905, but what they term ‘between group dif-
ferences’ caused by varying ecological and economic environments prevented its 
passage. Then, during the 1920s and 1930s the lobster industry in Maine experi-
enced a significant decline in catches, and competition from the Canadian lobster 
industry, which led to a third of lobster-fishers leaving the industry. Waring and 
Acheson describe this as a type of ‘cultural natural selection’. According to their 
narrative, these crises contributed to the passage of the double gauge law in 1933. 
Its passage was aided by the work of prominent actors, such as the Commissioner of 
Sea and Shore Fisheries, who spread support amongst lobstermen and legislators. 
According to the authors, selection at the individual level and at the state level were 
in conflict, and this was the reason for the political deadlock, until a major state-
wide crisis allowed the law to pass, which they term “strong group-level selection” 
(p. 27).
This is a case where we could deny that cultural selection is an appropriate expla-
nation at all. Without delving into this in depth, it seems that we could deny that 
there are groups here that are the right kind of cultural group for selection to take 
place (for example, we could question where states compete in the relevant sense). 
However, charitably, we can find a way to construe it as cultural selection on both 
the individual and group level: individuals who adopted the double gauge rule prior 
to the institution of the law would have been less successful than those who did not, 
and so the double gauge rule did not spread amongst individual lobsterers. Once 
crisis hit, the state of Maine had to adopt the double gauge law (perhaps copying it 
from neighbouring states, or Canadian provinces).10
Even so, the question of explanatory power seems highly relevant. Taking Waring 
and Acheson’s description of the historical changes as accurate, we can construct 
an alternative account that captures these changes, without the selection machin-
ery. Under a goal-directed agent account, the law did not pass when it was first pro-
posed due to the varying interests of those who would have to support the law in 
Footnote 9 (continued)
of cultural populations that can undergo selection in order to focus on the explanatory power of cultural 
selection. One core feature of cultural group selection, as with cultural selection more generally, is its 
capacity to explain ‘design without a designer’.
10 If Maine did copy the law from another state or province, this could be construed as an instance of 
‘selective imitation’, as described in Richerson et al. 2016. This is one type of cultural group selection 
where we can explain the spread of particular cultural traits through the imitation of successful groups.
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order to ensure its passage: many lobster fishermen and political actors representing 
their interests regarded the laws as simply limiting the profits they could make, and 
thereby harming the industry. The crisis in the 1920s and 1930s led to individuals 
changing their attitudes, as they realised that such conservation laws were necessary 
for the survival of their industry. Acheson himself, in previous work, characterises 
the passage of the law in this way. In an editorial piece for Anthropology News, 
he describes the attitudes of many lobster fishermen before the industry crisis as 
being happy to flout existing conservation rules, with many believing that breaking 
these rules would have little effect on the sustainability of the resource and therefore 
their livelihood. The extent of the crisis the industry subsequently faced had a causal 
role in changing these individual attitudes, meaning that lobster fishermen became 
increasingly convinced that conservation laws such as the double gauge law were 
critical for the survival of lobstering in Maine (Acheson 2010).
We can also include the role of powerful actors in such an account: Acheson 
(1997) describes Horatio Crie, the then Commissioner of Sea and Shore Fisheries, 
as rejecting a law that would have reduced the minimum size further, in the belief 
that this would cause the demise of the lobster population. He supported a double 
gauge law, seeing it as a political compromise and necessary for the longevity of the 
lobster industry. Although politicians in the Maine legislature were divided over this 
issue, with the help of a forceful speech given by Crie in support of the law, the law 
passed. Such an account explains cultural phenomena through the decision-making 
of individual agents, while still being able to accommodate institutional structures 
and cultural norms that constrain the decisions that individuals make.
I suggest that the goal-directed agent account is at least as explanatorily powerful 
as the cultural selection account here. The goal-directed agent account reduces our 
surprise at the explanandum (the passage of the law); it becomes significantly more 
expected. Perhaps a more thorough and nuanced historical account would reduce 
our surprise further. Regardless, a cultural selection account cannot reduce our sur-
prise any further than the goal-directed agent account can.
Cassava processing in South America
Joseph Henrich, in his 2015 book The Secret of Our Success, identifies a class of 
cultural phenomena that are arguably underexplained by historical, anthropological, 
or sociological frameworks, and proposes that these should be a particular target of 
cultural selection explanations. The class of phenomena that Henrich identifies is 
those behaviours which are adaptive (in that they are beneficial to an individual or 
group), but, crucially, where individuals are perhaps not aware of why these behav-
iours are adaptive, would find it difficult to find out why these are adaptive, and have 
not designed them specifically to be so. Here, accounts which rely on individual 
agency would struggle to explain the emergence, spread and persistence of these 
behaviours.
One example that Henrich uses is the consumption of cassava. Some varieties 
of cassava contain dangerous levels of cyanide, which if eaten without detoxifica-
tion, could result in chronic health problems, such as goiter and neurological issues. 
 A. Chellappoo 
1 3
   2  Page 16 of 23
However, communities in South America which rely on cassava as an important 
part of their diet, such as the Tukanoans, have a multi-step processing technique that 
occurs over several days and results in detoxified and safe to eat cassava. Henrich 
argues that any one individual would have difficulty working out this technique by 
themselves, and therefore individual learning fails to explain this adaptive behav-
iour. This is because the poisoning is slow, and so it would be difficult to figure out 
the connection between eating cassava and experiencing health issues. Additionally, 
the cassava stops being bitter before it stops being toxic, and therefore individuals 
who are relying on the signal of bitterness would continue to ingest unsafe levels of 
cyanide.
The steps in this procedure are ‘causally opaque’: individuals cannot easily infer 
the functions or importance of the behaviours they are carrying out. His explanation 
of the spread of this adaptive behaviour is based on social learning biases, includ-
ing the unconscious tendency of people to imitate the behaviour of more success-
ful, prestigious, or healthier members of their community. Over time, this behaviour 
spreads through a cultural selection process.
If we apply our strategy in this case, comparing Henrich’s account with a goal-
directed agent account, we are left with a very different result from the previous 
case. It is hard to see how a goal-directed agent account can explain why an individ-
ual carries out this time-consuming technique. A goal-directed agent account could 
likely explain certain aspects: the processing and consumption of cassava broadly 
could be understood with reference to an individual’s goal of being fed. However, 
the key aspect of the phenomena (indeed, the most intriguing aspect), the multi-
step technique that has an adaptive benefit and yet no easily discernible connection 
between the technique and the benefit, are left ‘surprising’. In contrast, the cultural 
selection explanation is clearly more powerful: social learning biases can drive 
the copying of adaptive traits, rendering this behaviour less surprising, or more 
expected.1112
11 This particular example has been called in question, with Mercier and Morin (2019) arguing that the 
ethnographic evidence suggests that the Tukanoans complete the final steps of cassava processing after it 
has stopped being bitter because they prefer the taste and texture after these steps. However, if we take 
Henrich’s account of the behaviours at face value, this at least gives us an example of how a cultural 
selection explanation might be powerful.
12 It is interesting to note that this stands out as a particularly persuasive example from Henrich’s book. 
Of the other cases that he draws on from small-scale societies, some have a similar structure, where 
an adaptive technique is causally opaque. Others do not: one example concerns groups in New Guinea 
which raise pigs. The success of a group depends in part on the group’s ability to raise large numbers 
of pigs. Henrich relays the work of anthropologist David Boyd who was living with one of these groups 
when the senior members decided to adopt the pig raising practices of another group, which was large, 
successful, and known for their pig production. These pig raising practices include not killing pigs who 
break into others’ gardens, no longer sending pigs to other villages, and feeding the pigs more food. Hen-
rich characterises this as intergroup competition via prestige-biased transmission. It is unclear to me that 
there is convincing causal opacity here: the link between not killing pigs, not sending them away, or tak-
ing better care of them and having more pigs seems relatively easy to work out.
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Objections
Here I will address two possible objections: firstly, that selection models are oper-
ating on a different level of explanation, and therefore the presence of successful 
intention-based explanations is not a reason to discount the application of cultural 
selection in a given case. Secondly, that cultural selection could still be a useful heu-
ristic, and therefore could productively guide research.
Are selection models operating at a different level of explanation?
One might argue that a cultural selection account and a goal-directed agent account 
are operating at different levels, and that therefore this contrastive strategy is mis-
placed. This objection can be made clearer by considering a biological analogy. 
Let us take the classic example of Darwin’s finches, where Darwin observed dif-
ferences in the dimensions of the beaks of finches living on different islands of the 
Galapagos archipelago. Evolution by natural selection can explain these differences 
in beak shape through adaptation to the different available food sources: individu-
als with beak shapes that allowed them to more effectively utilise food resources 
were selected for, surviving and reproducing more than individuals with less well-
adapted beaks. However, we could also offer an explanation on the level of the lives 
of individual birds. We could track the birth and death of each individual finch, and 
describe in detail, and perhaps with agential terms, how they lived their life and how 
many offspring each finch had. This would give us the same information as in the 
selection explanation, as we would have tracked differential survival and offspring 
production, although without the overarching framework. We could therefore per-
haps argue that there is no need to invoke selection here, as a life histories account 
also provides a successful explanation. However, this would be an odd argument to 
make in this biological case, when the explanatory power of natural selection seems 
so clear.
To apply this analogy to cultural selection, we could imagine that a historical 
account of cultural change might trace individual actors in great detail, whereas 
a cultural selection account would pick out particular types of causal processes. 
The cultural selection account may rely on the historical account in the sense that 
individual actions are driving the change, in the same way that a natural selec-
tion account relies on the life histories of individual organisms. Here, we might be 
tempted to think that a cultural selection account would be still be useful and power-
fully explanatory, because by abstracting away from details of the lives of particular 
individuals we can gain some insight into what is driving changes in the population 
as a whole.
One way of understanding this objection is to think about it in terms of the dif-
ference between ‘population thinking’ and either a goal-directed agent approach, or 
historical or social scientific approaches. The potential for ‘population thinking’ to 
generate novel insights could provide a motivation for applying cultural selection 
models to particular phenomena, even if successful historical, social scientific, or 
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anthropological explanations exist for these phenomena. In contrast to, for exam-
ple, ethnographic work, which attends to the particulars of individual experiences, a 
‘population thinking’ approach abstracts away from individuals and instead analyses 
the population-level consequences of the interactions of individuals with particu-
lar dispositions. Elliott Sober (1991, p. 492), in his analysis of the models of cul-
tural evolution found in Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson 
(1985), suggests that the usefulness of these models to the “day-to-day research of 
social scientists” depends on how good social scientists are at “intuitive population 
thinking”. Sober argues that social scientists are often primarily interested in the 
sources of particular ideas or norms, whilst cultural evolutionists are typically inter-
ested in the transmission patterns of these norms. However, social scientists do make 
qualitative assumptions about the transmission systems at work, and Sober claims 
that the cultural selection approach would impact social science work to the extent 
to which cultural selection models undermine these qualitative assumptions. Boyd 
and Richerson’s (2005, p. 97) response, as highlighted by Lewens (2018), empha-
sises that we are not all good intuitive population thinkers. Therefore, we would 
expect the adoption of the ‘population thinking’ perspective to generate unexpected 
insights, that we would not have arrived at without this approach, motivating the 
development of cultural selection frameworks.
However, it is possible to accept the value of ‘population thinking’ without 
adopting cultural selection as an explanation for cultural phenomena. Lewens (2010, 
2015) suggests that we can distinguish ‘population thinking’ (or kinetic theories 
of culture) from selection-based approaches. For example, a ‘population thinking’ 
approach could consider the population-level consequences that arise from a group 
of individuals with a particular social learning bias, such as the predisposition to 
adopt the most common cultural variant within their group (conformist bias). This 
may result in interesting and unintuitive results, such as the reduced ability for new 
cultural variants to spread throughout a group. We can understand this without 
invoking selection machinery here. This separation is clearly evident when consider-
ing the work of those in the ‘cultural attractor’ school of cultural evolution, such as 
Dan Sperber and Nicolas Claidière. These authors are often critical of cultural selec-
tion approaches (Sperber and Claidière 2006), and yet their own work is dependent 
upon ‘population thinking’, where this means understanding a cultural system as a 
“population of relatively autonomous items of different types with the frequency of 
types changing over time” (Claidière et al. 2014). Therefore, we need explicit moti-
vation for applying cultural selection in particular, rather than adopting a general 
‘population thinking’ perspective. The claim that cultural selection explanations can 
have equal explanatory power to goal-directed agent explanations is compatible with 
the possibility that a ‘population thinking’ approach could have value in these cases, 
although I will not suggest what this might look like or argue for this claim.
As I have argued in section  ‘Explaining ‘Design without a Designer’’, the key 
motivator for cultural selection approaches appears to be the explanation of ‘cultural 
adaptations’, and therefore ‘design without a designer’. If we accept this motivation, it 
seems that we can understand both cultural selection and goal-directed agent accounts 
to be at the same level and ultimately incompatible, rather than complementary. This is 
because, as I have argued, cultural selection should be able to explain ‘design without 
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a designer’. If a goal-directed agent account can explain the ‘design’, we have found a 
designer.
Can selection be a useful heuristic?
Another possible objection to the strategy I have outlined is that cultural selection could 
nevertheless provide a useful heuristic, even if it does not provide explanatory power 
over a goal-directed agent account in a particular domain. One potential benefit of 
using cultural selection frameworks could be the ability to ask certain kinds of ques-
tions: cultural selection can be seen as a heuristic, intended to generate hypotheses and 
structure empirical research. Cultural selection may therefore sometimes be a useful 
tool to structure and guide research, through changing the way that we approach phe-
nomena and the kinds of phenomena that are the subjects of study.
I accept we cannot rule this out, and therefore deploying my comparative strategy 
and finding the cultural selection explanation lacking does not provide a watertight rea-
son for dismissing cultural selection in a given case or domain. However, there is rea-
son for caution here.
Northcott and Alexandrova (2015), in their critical examination of the explanatory 
power of the Prisoners’ Dilemma in the social sciences, consider the possibility that 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma has heuristic value, even if it has limited explanatory payoffs. 
They focus on one of the most well-known cases of the application of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma to real-world phenomena, Robert Axelrod’s (1984) work on the ‘live-and-let-
live’ system of informal truces that arose in World War I trenches. They argue that the 
reliance on pre-existing historical work shows that Prisoners’ Dilemma-like thinking 
was already present in our analysis, and therefore did not lead to any causal explana-
tions we did not already possess. We can see a similar issue arising in the work of War-
ing and Acheson on lobstering in Maine: the reliance on historical or anthropological 
work to drive the explanations seems to tell against the heuristic value of the cultural 
selection approach, as cultural selection is not generating any new questions that were 
not already guiding research into these phenomena.
Additionally, we must be wary of using selection as a heuristic when there are sig-
nificant disanalogies between the structure of the phenomena in question and a selec-
tive process. This comes back to the question of whether cultural selection can pro-
vide an explanation at all. If cultural selection can explain, but only weakly, we might 
still see its value as a heuristic (although this value has to be demonstrated). If cultural 
selection, for reasons relating to the general debates about cultural systems outlined in 
section ‘Explaining ‘Design without a Designer’’, or because of features of a particular 
domain, cannot function as an explanation in the first place, then using selection as a 
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Conclusion
Cultural selection is a growing research programme, that promises to explain 
a wide range of cultural phenomena, ranging from prosocial tendencies that 
emerged in our distant past to the current behaviour of firms in a marketplace. 
However, arguments for cultural selection have often relied on the Lewontin con-
ditions, only demonstrating that selection models can be applied to culture, with-
out demonstrating the aptness of the explanation or the explanatory payoffs that 
arises from their application. This has further importance when considering the 
claims made regarding practical benefits of employing cultural selection models 
in the context of innovation and sustainability science.
I have suggested that, although the debate around the analogy between cul-
tural and biological systems has generated interesting and important insights, 
more attention needs to be paid to the explanatory power of cultural selection. I 
have argued that one core feature of cultural selection explanations is the capac-
ity to explain ‘design without a designer’: this ability is a key component of their 
explanatory power. In order to evaluate that explanatory power, I have introduced 
the strategy of comparing cultural selection accounts with goal-directed agent 
accounts.
I have then drawn on case studies to illustrate how this strategy might usefully 
be deployed to separate out powerful cultural explanations from weaker ones. 
The case of lobster fishing in Maine has provided a clear demonstration of how 
selection explanations can be applied to phenomena in a way that is explanatorily 
weak. In contrast, the case of cassava processing by the Tukanoans provides an 
example of when cultural selection does appear to be a powerful explanation in 
comparison with a goal-directed agent explanation.
This conceptual strategy is intended to be a first step in assessing where and 
when cultural selection might provide a powerful explanation. Further work 
will then be needed to compare cultural selection accounts to more nuanced or 
detailed alternatives. Given that we are surrounded with a wealth of frameworks 
for understanding culture, this comparative approach is necessary for a rigorous 
evaluation of cultural selection.
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